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  This paper starts by separating the transformational recession (reduction of output in 
most transition economies in the first half of the 1990s) from the process of economic growth 
(recovery from the transformational recession) in 28 transition economies (including China, 
Vietnam and Mongolia). It is argued that the former (the collapse of output during transition) can be 
best explained as adverse supply shock caused mostly by a change in relative prices after their 
deregulation due to distortions in industrial structure and trade patterns accumulated during the 
period of central planning, and by the collapse of state institutions during transition period, while 
the speed of liberalization, to the extent it was endogenous, i.e. determined by political economy 
factors, had an adverse effect on performance. In contrast, at the recovery stage the ongoing 
liberalization starts to affect growth positively, whereas the impact of pre-transition distortions 
disappears. Institutional capacity and reasonable macroeconomic policy, however, continue to be 
important prerequisites for successful performance.  
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  11. Introduction   
  This paper starts by separating the transformational recession (reduction of output in most 
transition economies in the first half of the 1990s) from the process of economic growth (recovery 
from the transformational recession). It is argued that the former (the collapse of output during 
transition) can be best explained as adverse supply shock caused mostly by a change in relative 
prices after their deregulation due to distortions in industrial structure and trade patterns 
accumulated during the period of central planning, and by the collapse of state institutions during 
transition period, while the speed of liberalization had an adverse effect on performance, if any.  In 
contrast, the latter process (recovery) should be treated as a normal growth process and could be 
modeled with the tools of conventional growth theory: it could be expected that in the sufficiently 
long run it would be possible to capitalize on liberalization due to the increase in factors efficiency 
that would lead to better performance.    
  Based on previous literature (see Popov, 2000 for the review) the following framework for 
explaining the collapse of output during transformational recession is accepted. First, 
transformational recession was caused by the adverse supply shock that resulted from deregulation 
of prices and change in relative price ratios that created the need for reallocation of resources due to 
distortions in the industrial structure and external trade patterns that existed before transition. 
Second, by another adverse supply shock associated with the collapse of state institutions 
(understood as the ability of the state to enforce its rules and regulations), which occurred in the late 
1980s - early 1990s and which resulted in chaotic transformation through crisis management 
instead of organized and manageable transition. And third, by poor economic policies, which 
basically consisted of macroeconomic mismanagement, no matter whether the pursued reforms 
were gradual or radical. Fast speed of reform per se (shock versus gradual transition) at the initial 
stage of transition probably aggravated the reduction of output because immediate deregulation of 
prices caused the need for restructuring (reallocation of labor and capital) that exceeded the 
investment potential of the economy.  
    In the first approximation, economic recession that occurred during transition was 
associated with the need to reallocate resources in order to correct the industrial structure inherited 
from centrally planned economy (CPE). These distortions include over-militarization and 
overindustrialization (resulting in the underdevelopment of the service sector), perverted trade 
flows among former Soviet republics and Comecon countries, excessively large size and poor 
  2specialization of industrial enterprises and agricultural farms (lack of small enterprises and farms). 
In most cases these distortions were more pronounced in former Soviet Union countries (FSU) than 
in Eastern Europe (EE), not to speak about China and Vietnam, – the larger the distortions, the 
greater was the reduction of output. Transformational recession, to put in economic terms, was 
caused by adverse supply shock similar to the one experienced by Western countries after the oil 
price hikes in 1973 and 1979, and similar to post-war recessions caused by conversion of the 
defense industries. 
The additional reason for the extreme depth and length of the transformational recession 
was associated with the institutional collapse – here differences between EE countries and FSU are 
striking. The efficiency of state institutions, understood as the ability of the state to enforce its own 
rules and regulations, resulted in the inability of the state to perform its traditional functions – to 
collect taxes and to constraint the shadow economy, to ensure property and contract rights and law 
and order in general (crime rates and corruption increased dramatically during transition as 
compared to the communist past). Naturally, poor ability to enforce rules and regulations did not 
create business climate conducive to growth and resulted in the increased costs for companies. 
  It is precisely this strong institutional framework that should be held responsible for both – 
for the success of gradual reforms in China and shock therapy in Vietnam, where strong 
authoritarian regimes were preserved and CPE institutions were not dismantled before new market 
institutions were created; and for the relative success of radical reforms in EE countries, especially 
in Central European countries, where strong democratic regimes and new market institutions 
emerged quickly. And it is precisely the collapse of strong state institutions that started in the USSR 
in the late 1980s and continued in the successor states in the 1990s that explains the extreme length, 
if not the extreme depth of the FSU transformational recession. 
  What lead to the institutional collapse and could it have been prevented? Using the 
terminology of political science, it is appropriate to distinguish between strong authoritarian 
regimes (China and Vietnam and to an extent – Belarus and Uzbekistan), strong democratic regimes 
(Central European countries) and weak democratic regimes (most FSU and Balkan states). The 
former two are politically liberal or liberalizing, i. e. protect individual rights, including those of 
property and contracts, and create a framework of law and administration, while the latter regimes, 
though democratic, are politically not so liberal since they lack strong institutions and the ability to 
enforce law and order (Zakaria, 1997). This gives rise to the phenomenon of “illiberal democracies” 
  3– countries, where competitive elections are introduced before the rule of law is established. While 
European countries in the XIX century and East Asian countries recently moved from first 
establishing the rule of law to gradually introducing democratic elections (Hong Kong is the most 
obvious example of the rule of law without democracy), in Latin America, Africa, and now in CIS 
countries democratic political systems were introduced in societies without the firm rule of law. 
Authoritarian regimes (including communist), while gradually building property rights and 
institutions, were filling the vacuum in the rule of law via authoritarian means. After 
democratization occurred and illiberal democracies emerged, they found themselves deprived of old 
authoritarian instruments to ensure law and order, but without the newly developed democratic 
mechanisms needed to guarantee property rights, contracts and law and order in general. No 
surprise, this had a devastating impact on investment climate and output. 
There is a clear relationship between the ratio of rule of law index on the eve of transition to 
democratization index, on the one hand, and economic performance during transition, on the other. 
To put it differently, democratization without strong rule of law, whether one likes it or not, usually 
leads to the collapse of output. There is a price to pay for early democratization, i.e. introduction of 
competitive elections of government under the conditions when the major liberal rights (personal 
freedom and safety, property, contracts, fair trial in court, etc.) are not well established. 
Finally, performance was of course affected by economic policy. Given the weak 
institutional capacity of the state, i.e. its poor ability to enforce its own regulations, economic 
policies could hardly be “good”. Weak state institutions usually imply populist macroeconomic 
policies (budget deficits resulting in high indebtedness and/or inflation, overvalued exchange rates), 
which have devastating impact on output. On the other hand, strong institutional capacity does not 
lead automatically to responsible economic policies. Examples range from the USSR before it 
collapsed (periodic outburst of open or hidden inflation) to such post Soviet states as Uzbekistan 
and Belarus, which seem to have stronger institutional potential than other FSU states, but do not 
demonstrate higher macroeconomic stability.  
Regressions tracing the impact of all mentioned factors are reported in table 1. If the rule of 
law and democracy indices (see data section for definitions) are included into the basic regression 
equation, they have predicted signs (positive impact of the rule of law and negative impact of 
democracy) and are statistically significant (equation 1), which is consistent with the results 
  4obtained for larger sample of countries
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. The best explanatory power, however, is exhibited by the 
index that is computed as the ratio of the rule of law index to democracy index: 83% of all 
variations in output can be explained by only three factors – pre-transition distortions, inflation, and 
rule-of-law-to-democracy index (table 1, equation 2). If liberalization variable is added, it turns out 
to be statistically insignificant and does not improve the goodness of fit (equation 3). At the same 
time, the ratio of the rule of law to democracy index and the decline in government revenues are not 
substitutes, but rather complement each other in characterizing the process of the institutional 
decay. These two variables are not correlated and improve the goodness of fit, when included 
together in the same regression: R
2 increases to 91% (equation 5) – better result than in regressions 
with either one of these variables. The liberalization index, when added to the same equation, only 
deteriorates the goodness of fit, is not statistically significant, and has the “wrong” sign. 
To test the robustness of the results, another year for the end of the transformational 
recession was chosen – 1998, so the period considered was 1989-98 (by the end of 1998 the 
absolute trough was reached in 24 countries out of 26 that experienced the recession). The adjusted 
R
2 is slightly lower, but the statistical significance of coefficients remains high (with the exception 
of the initial GDP per capita). The best equation is shown below:  
 
Log(Y98/89)=5.8-.006DIST-0.005Ycap87-0.39WAR-0.01GOVREVdecline -0.17logINFL -.003DEM 
          (-2.48)             (-0.09)              (-3.22)    (-2.94)        (-4.60)         (-1.74)  
 
(N= 28, Adjusted R
2 = 82%, T-statistics in brackets, all variables are shown in the same order as in 
equation 7 from table 1 (liberalization variable is omitted).  
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 For a larger sample of countries (all developing and developed countries, not only transition economies), the result is 
that there is a threshold level of the rule of law index: if it is higher than a certain level, democratization affects growth 
positively, if lower – democratization impedes growth (Polterovich, Popov, 2005). For the regressions reported in table 
1 (to explain changes in output in 1989-96) averages of rule of law and democracy indices were used for the longer 
period (1989-98) to account for the fact that business agents often anticipate changes in business climate that are 
captured in experts’ estimates only later.   
  5Table 1. Regression of change in GDP in 1989-96 on initial conditions, policy factors, and rule 
of law and democracy indices, robust estimates  
Dependent variable = log (1996 GDP as a % of 1989 GDP) 
For China - all indicators are for the period of 1979-86 or similar 
Equations, Number of  















Constant  5.3*** 5.4*** 5.2*** 5.4*** 5.4***  5.5***  5.7*** 
Distortions, % of GDPa  -.005** -.005** -.003  -.006** -.007*** -.007*** -.007***
1987 PPP GDP per capita, % 
of the US level 
-.009** -.006*  -.007** -.007** -.009*** -.008 
*** 
-.008***
War dummyb     - . 1 9
c -.36*** -.37*** -.45*** 
Decline in government 
revenues as a % of GDP 
from 1989-91 to 1993-96 




Liberalization  index    .05     -.02  .03 
Log (Inflation, % a year, 
1990-95, geometric average)  
-.16*** -.20*** -.18*** -.17*** -.13***  -.13***  -.14*** 
Rule of law index,  average 
for 1989-97, % 
.008 
*** 
        
Democracy index, average 
for 1990-98, %  
-.005 
*** 
       -.003** 
Ratio of the rule of law to 
democracy index 
  .07*** .07*** .06*** .05***  .05***   
Adjusted R2, %  82 83 83 85 91  91  90 
*, **, *** - Significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
aCumulative measure of distortions as a % of GDP equal to the sum of defense expenditure (minus 3% regarded as the 
'normal' level), deviations in industrial structure and trade openness from the 'normal' level, the share of heavily 
distorted trade (among the FSU republics) and lightly distorted trade (with socialist countries) taken with a 33% weight 
– see (Popov, 2000) for details.         
  bEquals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries.       
 
c Significant at 13% level. 
 
This latter conclusion still remains most controversial – the emerging consensus today, if 
any, seems to be that performance is largely determined by the institutional capacity (the factor that 
was overlooked in the earlier debates), but economic liberalization still matters a great deal 
(Demelo et al., 1997; Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2003). The theoretical argument in favor of the 
positive impact of liberalization on performance is quite strong: market economy should be more 
efficient than the centrally planned economy, so there is a “marketization dividend” to be reaped, 
and the faster economic liberalization occurs, the better should be the performance. However, there 
are a number of obvious facts that do not fit into the scheme. 
  6          First, China – the only country that carried out classical gradual transition (with slow 
deregulation of prices – dual track price system) outperformed impressively all other transition 
economies, and of course Chinese example is too important to ignore. Second, the comparison of 
Vietnam and China - two countries that shared a lot of similarities in initial conditions and achieved 
basically the same results (immediate growth of output without transformational recession) despite 
different reform strategies. While Chinese reforms are a classical example of gradualism, 
Vietnamese reformers introduced Polish style shock therapy treatment (instant deregulation of most 
prices and introduction of convertibility of dong) even before Poland did, in 1989, and still 
managed to avoid the reduction of output
4
. Third, differing performance of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) states. The champions of liberalization and stabilization in the region were definitely Baltic 
states (cumulative liberalization index by 1995 - 2.4-2.9), whereas Uzbekistan (with the same index 
of 1.1) is commonly perceived to be one of the worst procrastinators. But in Uzbekistan the 
reduction of output in 1990-95 totaled only 18% and the economy started to grow again in 1996, 
while in the Baltics output fell in the early 1990s by 36-60% and even in 1996, two years after the 
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 While Vietnamese industry, excluding constantly and rapidly growing oil production, experienced some downturn in 
1989-90 (-6% in 1989 and 0% in 1990) agricultural growth remained strong, so that GDP growth rates virtually did not 
















































  In 2004-2005, the list of countries that exceeded the pre-recession level of output in 1989 
looked very much like a list of procrastinators in terms of economic liberalization and non-
democratic regimes in terms of political liberalization: in addition to 5 central European countries 
and Estonia, there were also Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Kazakhstan (see fig. 1, 2)
5
, not 
to speak about China and Vietnam. Thus, the case for gradual, Chinese-type reforms remains very 
strong and is very much favored by many academics and policy makers – see (Kolodko, 2000) for 
an extensive summary of the debate.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
fall (5-6% a year).    
5 5
   Fig. 1 is based on GDP indices (2004 as a % of 1989) reported in the EBRD Transition Report 2005, whereas fig. 2 
reports chain indices (based on annual growth rates) from the same source. The discrepancies are not that substantial.   
  82.  The hypothesis – why shock therapy may lead to worse performance 
than gradual transition 
  There are now quite a number of papers that offer the models explaining why gradual 
transition may lead to a better performance as compared to the shock therapy – see (Popov, 2000) 
and (Roland, 2000) for a survey. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) claimed that, if the 
weakening state is not able to enforce production quotas under the system of dual pricing, transfer 
of resources to the private sector with market prices creates bottlenecks and shortages in the state 
sector, resulting in the fall of total output. Friedman and Johnson (1995) argued that in the presence 
of complementarities between government policies and enterprise attributes and convex adjustment 
costs for enterprises (i.e. costs increasing with the speed of reforms) radical "big bang" reforms 
might not necessarily be optimal. It was also argued (Li, 1996) that in the absence of competitive 
product markets (monopolization) on the outset of the reforms shock therapy can only lead to the 
reduction of output, while incremental reforms, such as Chinese type dual track pricing system 
forcing enterprises to meet production quotas, but allowing them to sell above-the-plan output at 
market prices, may contribute to the expansion of output. Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997) showed 
that if state firms are allowed to choose between market and centrally planned prices (for both - 
inputs and outputs), then not only the Pareto optimality is guaranteed at the end of the process, but 
also – with the appropriate state allocation of cheap resources and production quotas – it could be 
ensured that at every stage of the transition process no one is going to be worse off and at least 
someone is constantly made better off. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) suggested a disorganization 
explanation: they assumed that state enterprises make a “take it or leave it” proposals on prices of 
resources, that there are costs of finding partners, and that production stops, if the critical resource 
is lacking. Roland and Verdier (1999) also focused on disorganization and showed that investment 
and output may fall as a result of immediate price deregulation due to the need to find new partners 
(disorganization effect) and that under gradual dual track price liberalization it is possible avoid this 
effect. Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) suggested that the increase in unemployment creates a need for 
higher taxes to finance unemployment insurance payments and that higher taxes depress output.  
  The problem with these explanations, however, is that although theoretically plausible, they 
do not seem to capture the basic stylized facts of transition, but at best – only marginal effects. It 
was neither the disorganization, nor unemployment insurance payments, nor monopolization effects 
that drove output down in transition economies during the transformational recession. As was 
  9argued earlier, the nature of the recession was basically an adverse supply shock caused by the 
change in relative prices. The evidence for all transition economies is in table 1: the reduction of 
output by country is well explained by the indicator of distortions in industrial structure and trade 
patterns (it remains statistically significant no matter what control variables are added). The 
magnitude of distortions, in turn, determines the change in relative prices, when they are 
deregulated. As fig. 3 shows, the reduction of output in Russia during the transformational 
recession was to a large extent structural in nature: industries with the greatest adverse supply shock 
(deteriorating terms of trade – relative price ratios for outputs and inputs), such as light industry, 
experienced the largest reduction of output.  
 
FIG. 3 
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The adverse supply shock due to deregulation of prices framework allows to explain the 
varying impact of economic liberalization on performance at the recession stage and during 
economic recovery. Consider a country where deregulation of prices (or elimination of trade 
tariffs/subsidies) leads to a change in relative price ratios and thus produces an adverse supply 
shock for at least some industries. Capital should be reallocated from industries facing declining 
relative prices and profitability to industries with rising relative prices. Assume that 20% of the total 
output is concentrated in non-competitive industries: this whole sector should disappear either 
  10gradually or at once depending on how fast relative prices will change; capital is not homogeneous 
and cannot be moved to the competitive sector, whereas labor can be reallocated to the competitive 
sector without costs. Marginal capital productivity in the competitive sector is higher than in the 
non-competitive and is equal to 1/3. Assume further that all investments go into the competitive 
sector, and that net investment is equal to 10% of GDP. Under these simple assumptions we get 


















          














































output in a NC
sector at 100%
annually
Assumptions: size of non-competitive sector (NC) in the initial year = 20% of total output; net investment (s) = 10% of 
total output; marginal capital productivity, output increase per unit of net investment (a) = 1/3.
 
 




 Total output consists of output of competitive and non-competitive sectors: Y and is equal to 1 or 
100% in the initial year. Output in the non-competitive sector in the year n,Y , is equal to the share of the non-









n ) 1 α is the rate of reduction of 
output in the non-competitive sector determined by the speed of deregulation: Y . Output in the 
competitive sector in the year n is equal to the output of the preceding year,Y , plus the increase in output equal to 
NC
n NC




  11  If reforms are carried out instantly, then output in the unprofitable sector, accounting, 
say, for 20% of total output, falls immediately and savings for investment are generated only by the 
competitive sector, so that it takes 7 years to reach the pre-recession level of output. However, 
assume that reforms are carried out slowly (gradual price deregulation or elimination of 
tariffs/subsidies), so that every year output in the non-competitive sector falls by 30%. In this case 
transformational recession is milder, total output recovers by the 5
th year 
  The best trajectory, of course, is the one with such a speed of deregulation that leads to 
the reduction of output in the non-competitive sector at a natural rate, i.e. as its fixed capital stock 
retires in the absence of new investment. If the retirement rate of fixed assets in the non-competitive 
sector is 10%, so that output there falls by 10% annually, there would be no reduction of output at 
all. On the contrary, growth rates would increase constantly approaching the steady state 3.4% 
annually by the year 25.  The slower rate of deregulation implying a more gradual output reduction 
in the non-competitive industries would require some investment into supporting capital stock and 
output in the non-competitive sector. This is clearly a sub-optimal option (if the goal is to achieve 
highest productivity) since productivity of this investment in non-competitive sector is lower than 
elsewhere by definition. However, it allows to employ to slow down the speed of restructuring 
(reallocation of labor force).  
The example illustrates that there is a limit to the speed of reallocating capital from non-
competitive to competitive industries, which is determined basically by the net investment/GDP 
ratio (gross investment minus retirement of capital stock in the competitive industries, since in non-
competitive industries the retiring capital stock should not be replaced anyway). It is not reasonable 
to wipe away output in non-competitive industries faster than capital is being transferred to more 
efficient industries. If there are other factors of production (labor) that can be transferred faster than 
capital, there is a trade-off between using labor in non-competitive industries, but with high 
capital/labor ratios, and transferring this same labor to competitive industries, but without much 
capital (low capital/labor ratios) for the time being. But the same logic that applies to physical 
capital could be applied to human capital as well.  
                                                                                                                                                                  








n Y Y Y Y + + = −
marginal capital productivity, a, multiplied by the share of net investment in GDP, s, multiplied by total output: 










* ) 1 ( 1 Y . 
  12Market type reforms in many post-communist economies created exactly this kind of a 
bottleneck. Countries that followed shock therapy path found themselves in a supply-side recession 
that is likely to become a textbook example: an excessive speed of change in relative prices 
required the magnitude of restructuring that was simply non-achievable with the limited pool of 
investment. Up to half of their economies was made non-competitive overnight, output in these 
non-competitive industries was falling for several years and fell in some cases to virtually zero, 
whereas the growth of output in competitive industries was constrained, among other factors, by the 
limited investment potential and was not enough to compensate for the output loss in the inefficient 
sectors (Popov, 2000)
7
.   
Hence, at least one general conclusion from the study of the experience of transition 
economies appears to be relevant for the reform process in all countries: provided that reforms 
create a need for restructuring (reallocation of resources), the speed of reforms should be such that 
the magnitude of required restructuring does not exceed the investment potential of the economy.  
In short, the speed of adjustment and restructuring in every economy is limited, if only due to the 
limited investment potential needed to reallocate capital stock. This is the main rationale for 
gradual, rather than instant, phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, of subsidies and other forms 
of government support of particular sectors (it took nearly 10 years for the European Economic 
Community or for NAFTA to abolish tariffs). This is a powerful argument against shock therapy, 
especially when reforms involved result in a sizable reallocation of resources. For Western 
countries with low trade barriers, low subsidies, low degree of price controls, etc. even fast, radical 
reforms are not likely to require restructuring that would exceed the limit of investment potential. 
But for less developed countries with a lot of distortions in their economies supported by explicit 
and implicit subsidies, fast removal of these subsidies could easily result in such a need for 
restructuring that is beyond the ability of the economy due to investment and other constraints.  
  However, such a reduction of output due to the inability of the economy to adjust rapidly to 
new price ratios is by no means inevitable, if the deregulation of prices proceeds gradually (or if 
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 The problem is still there for many transition economies, since many domestic price ratios are quite different from 
those of the world market. Fuel and energy prices, for instance, in most cases are still way below the world market 
prices. To cite one example, in Russia electricity tariffs at the end of the 1990s were about 1 US cent per kw-h, whereas 
in Western and even in Central European countries they amounted to 10 cents (EBRD, 2001). Meanwhile, the 3
rd most 
important Russian export commodity (after oil and gas) was extremely energy intensive aluminum, produced out of 
largely imported bauxite. If Russian electric energy prices are increased to the world level instantly, investment required 
  13losses from deteriorating terms of trade for most affected industries are compensated by subsidies). 
The pace of liberalization had to be no faster than the ability of the economy to move resources 
from non-competitive (under the new market price ratios) to competitive industries.  
  Therefore, it should be expected that regression analysis would reveal the negative 
relationship between performance and the speed of liberalization at the stage of the reduction of 
output and the positive impact of liberalization on performance at the stage of recovery. It should be 
also expected that the larger magnitude of distortions in industrial structure and trade patterns 
would lead to the greater reduction of output during the transformational recession, but would not 
have much of an impact on performance during the recovery stage (after the noncompetitive sector 
would be shut down completely).  In both cases – at the recession stage and in the recovery period –
the institutional capacity and the quality of macroeconomic policy should be expected to have a 
positive impact on performance.  
 
     3 .   T h e   d a t a  
  The description of the data and the sources is in table 2 that is largely self-explanatory. 
There is one issue though that deserves a closer scrutiny – the criteria for distinguishing between 
the recession and recovery periods.  
  In FSU states (fig. 1) recession started in most cases in 1990 (for Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – in 1991), whereas the bottom of the recession was reached in 1993-
95 in some countries (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan), but more 
often later – in 1996-99 (Moldova and Ukraine were the last countries to bottom out in 1999). So, in 
fact recession lasted from 3 to 10 years. In East European countries similar variations are observed 
(fig. 5): recession lasted 2 years in Poland (1990-91), 3-4 years in other Central European countries, 
5 years in the Baltic states, 8 and 10 years respectively in Bulgaria and Romania. China and 
Vietnam did not experience any recession – their growth rates for the period of reforms were 




                                                                                                                                                                  
to create jobs just for the workers of going out of business aluminum smelters and other energy intensive enterprises 
may exceed the meager investment potential of the whole national economy.    
  14Table 2. Description of the data and sources (indicators for China are always for the period 
10 years earlier) 
Indicator Comments    Sources 
Real GDP change  Recession – 1989-96; 
Recovery 1995-2003 
EBRD (Transition Reports)
Pre-transition distortions   Differences in industrial and external trade 
structure between centrally planned and market 
economies 
Data and explanations are 
in Popov (2000)  
PPP GDP per capita in 
1987 
    (De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, 
1996) 
War  dummy  Equals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, 
Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for 
all other countries 
 
FSU  dummy  Equals 1 for 15 FSU countries and 0 for all 
other countries 
 
Decline in government 
revenues as a % of GDP 
from 1989-91 to 1993-
96 
Difference between the average share of 
government revenues in GDP in 1989-91 and 
this same average share in 1993-96, p.p. 
EBRD Transition Reports 
for FSU and EE countries, 
Asian Development Bank 
for China (adjusted as 
explained in Popov, 2000), 
Mongolia, Vietnam 
Increase in the share of 
shadow economy in 
GDP in 1989-94, p.p. 
Estimates based on electricity consumption – 
conservative elasticity scenario  
Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
(1996)  
Rule of law index,   
average for 1989-97, % 
The rule of law index is taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide and 
calibrated, so that 100% corresponds to the 
highest possible rule of law. 
(Campos, 2000; 
International Country Risk 
Guide) 
Democracy index, 
average for 1990-98, %  
The democracy index is the average of Freedom 
House political rights index for 1990-98, but 
inverted and calibrated, so that complete 
democracy coincides with 100%, whereas 





liberalization index by 
1995
8
Experts’ estimate of the level of liberalization 
achieved by 1995 on a 1 to 4.5 scale (highest 
liberalization – 4.5 – is in OECD countries) 
De Melo et al. (1996) 
Increase in economic 
liberalization index in 
1995-2003 
The level of index in 2003 minus it’s level in 
1995 (negative sign indicates strengthening of 
regulations) 
EBRD Transition Reports; 
conservative estimates for 
China, Vietnam, Mongolia 
                                                 
8 8
   This liberalization index is constructed as explained earlier in De Melo et al. (1996) as the sum of liberalization 
“flows” for 6 years (1989-94 for all countries, except China, for which the period in 1979-84). Assuming that before 
transition the level of liberalization in communist economies was negligible, the 1995 liberalization index can be 
interpreted as the cumulative “stock” of liberalization by 1995 or as the total “flow” of liberalization in the first six 
years of reforms. 
 
  15Annual average inflation 
in 1990-95  












     










































































































  To make things even more complicated, in some countries there were interruptions of 
growth after the recession seem to have ended. Romania and Bulgaria that experienced currency 
crises are most notable examples (fig. 5), but similar interruptions occurred in Czech Republic in 
1997-99, in Estonia and Lithuania, Kazakhstan and Russia in 1998. (fig. 5). In most, if not all cases, 
these growth reversals were caused by poor macroeconomic policy (exchange rate overvaluation) 
before and during the East Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency crisis. These episodes can 
hardly be treated as the continuation of transformational recession. Considering these reversals as 
the ‘ordinary” (non-transformational) recessions, the average (unweighted) year for the end of 
  16recession for 26 countries that experienced downturns associated with deregulation of prices 
(excluding China and Vietnam) is between 1995 and 1996.  
  Most authors, while explaining the comparative performance of transition economies, use 
the most transparent and conventional measure – GDP in the recent year as compared to the pre-
recession period (1989 or 1990). There was an attempt to account not only for the varying depth, 
but also for the different length of the recession by computing the integral loss of output (World 
Bank, 1996), but this measure was never widely accepted. My own calculations (Popov, 1998) 
show that the cumulative decline in output (from peak to trough), computed as the sum of non-
discounted deviations of output for every single year of recession in 1989-96 period from 1989 
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  In view of the above, both measures of the magnitude of recession were used in regressions 
for 1989-96 period, and it turned out that there are no any major differences in signs and statistical 
significance of explanatory variables. So, for this paper 1996 was chosen as the year of the bottom 
of the recession for 1989-96 regressions (to capture the declines in output in FSU states).  In turn, 
  171995 was selected as the year that immediately preceded recovery (to capture the new declines in 
output that occurred in Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1996-99 and that were caused most 
probably by macroeconomic mismanagement, so cannot be treated as the continuation of the 
transformational recession). To test the robustness of results, the alternative year – 1998 – was 
chosen as the year of the trough and all regressions were recalculated for the periods of 1989-98 
(recession) and 1998-2005 (recovery) – the results were virtually unchanged (see section 1 and 
Appendix).   
  It remains to be said that all indicators for China are for the period of 10 years earlier (1979-
86) because the market oriented reforms started in this country in 1979
10
. This approach, however, 
is also not crucial: Chinese growth was rather even since 1979, so the major results stand, no matter 
what period is chosen for China. On top of that, if China and Vietnam are excluded from the 
regressions, the goodness of fit and statistical significance of explanatory variables usually 
improves. This suggests that there are other factors (export oriented industrial policy, probably) that 
contributed to rapid growth of these Asian transition economies and that are not accounted for in 
regressions, which is a separate story, of course (Polterovich, Popov, 2002; 2004). The point to 
make here, however, is that the regression results reported in this paper are quite robust to the 
timing of transformational recession and subsequent recovery, as well as to the inclusion/exclusions 
of observations on China and Vietnam.   
  
   4.  Post-recession  recovery 
  Factors that determine performance in the recovery period, i.e. after the transformational 
recession is over, are somewhat different from the factors affecting performance during 
transformational recession. First, cumulative levels of liberalization achieved by 1995 appear to 
play a positive role at the initial stage of recovery, 1994-98 (fig. 7).  At the subsequent stages the 
level of cumulative liberalization achieved by the mid 1990s does not seem to be important (fig.8), 
but the progress in liberalization (increase in its level during recovery) appears to affect 
performance positively (fig. 9). This result is confirmed by the regression analysis (table 3) – in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9
 The cumulative decline of output for many countries is higher than 100% because the output losses for a number of 
years are summed up. For China and Vietnam the cumulative decline in output is negative, i.e. should be interpreted as 
cumulative gain in GDP for the period.  
  18most specifications the increase of liberalization during the recovery, in 1995-2005, has a positive 
and significant effect on economic growth (although the level of liberalization by the mid 1990s is 
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 In Vietnam economic reforms started in 1986 (“don moi” course), they resembled very much Gorbachev type 
marginal reforms in the same period, and it was not until 1989 that most prices were deregulated that caused some 
reduction of output in non-oil industry, but not in other sectors, so GDP growth rates did not decline.   
  19 
FIG. 9 
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 Second,  pre-transition  distortions and pre-transition level of GDP per capita do not play any 
significant role in explaining performance in the recovery period – the coefficients of these 
variables are not statistically significant in any of the specifications
12
. The war dummy variable is 
always significant, but acquires a positive sign (unlike for the recession period, when it was 
negative) suggesting that countries that suffered from wars in the first part of the 1990s recovered 
faster in the second half of the decade benefiting from the effects of post-war reconstruction.  
And finally, third, indicators that determine institutional capacity, such as the rule of law 
index (positively), the decline in the ratio of government revenues in GDP and democratization 
(negatively), continue to affect performance during recovery in the same way they affected 
performance during the transformational recession.  
These results are very consistent with intuition and previous explanations. During the 
transformational recession the reduction of output was determined by the magnitude of the pre-
transition distortions and by the collapse of institutions, whereas the speed of liberalization did not 
have any significant impact on performance. In, the impact of the speed of liberalization was very 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11
 The level of the liberalization by 1995 is negatively correlated with the increase of the liberalization index in 1995-
2003, so both indices cannot be included into the same regression (when both are included, one or both become 
insignificant).   
12
 This is consistent with the result obtained in (Popov, 2000) and Godoy and Stiglitz (2004).  
  20likely negative, if any – rapid deregulation of prices caused an adverse supply shock that was 
beyond the ability of the economy to reallocate resources. The reason, why this negative impact of 
immediate deregulation of prices does not show up in regressions is that indices of liberalization 
only partially reflect the speed of price deregulation and, besides, there was in fact only one country 
(China) that carried out price deregulation gradually via the dual track price system. The other 
possible reason is the endogeneity of liberalization variable – the issue is dealt with in the next 
section. 
 
Table 3. Regression of change in GDP in 1995-2005 on initial conditions, institutional 
capacity, liberalization and rule of law and democracy indices, robust estimates 
Dependent variable = 2005 GDP as a % of 1995 GDP 
For China - all indicators are for the period of 1979-86 or similar 
Equations, Number of  













Constant 114***  90***  113***  150***  74***  102*** 
1996 GDP as a % of 1989 GDP  .39***  .59***  .58***    .33**   
War dummya    38.1*** 64.8.4*** 41.8**  49.8***  32.5** 
Liberalization index in 1995      -30.4***  -25.3***     




28.3***     29.4 
*** 
29.4*** 
Decline in government revenues as a % of 
GDP from 1989-91 to 1993-96 
     -1.13***    -1.03***
Rule of law index,  average for 1989-97, %      1.13**  1.86***  1.26***  1.60*** 
Democracy index, average for 1990-98, %         -.70***  -.73***  -.99*** 
Adjusted R2, %  30  48 52  56 60  63 
*, **, *** - Significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  




  During the recovery stage, after the inefficient enterprises were shut down in the course of 
the transformational recession, the pre-transition distortions do not affect performance any longer, 
but liberalization increases start to matter and to pay off. Controlling for the country effects via 
introducing the indicator of previous performance (GDP change in 1989-96), we get positive 
correlation between increases in liberalization and performance in 1995-2005. This result is fully 
consistent with theory (marketization dividend), but it is observed only at the stage of recovery, 
when the decline of the inefficient sectors of the economy comes to a halt.   
  21  And the impact of institutional capacity of the state on performance is the same at both 
stages – during transformational recession and during the post-recession recovery. Democratization 
without rule of law undermines institutional capacity, which has a devastating impact on output 
(Polterovich, Popov, 2005). This mechanism of the weakening of the institutional capacity in 
illiberal democracies is only partly associated with the reduction of the size of the state, i.e. decline 
in the share of state revenues in GDP. The other part of the process is the decrease in the efficiency 
of the provision of the public goods – even controlling for the decline in the ratio of state revenues 
to GDP, the positive impact of rule of law on growth and the negative impact of democratization 
persists.  
  To test the robustness, another dependent variable was used – GDP in 2003 as a % of 1995 
(because at the time of writing 2005 GDP figures were still preliminary, whereas 2004 figures were 
expected to be revised). The results however were virtually unchanged – in all regressions statistical  
significance of the independent variables remained high. Another robustness test – the use of 1998 
as the year of the beginning of the recovery: by this time all countries, except Moldova and 
Romania, reached the absolute bottom of output for 1898-5005 period. The difference in this case is 
that the control variable for the output change during the recession period (1989-96) becomes 
insignificant and the significance of the war dummy variable falls to 10% level. The equation 5 
from table 3, for instance, takes the following form: 
  
 
Y2005/98 =  118.48 + 17.9WAR – .068DEM + 0.82RULEofLAW + 20.95LIBER 
    (6.77)      (1.75)    (-3.96)   (2.44)    (4.43) 
 
N=28, Adjusted R
2 = 58%, T-statistics in brackets. 
 
 
   5. Dealing with the endogeneity 
Many authors (Heybey, Murrell, 1999; Krueger, Ciolko, 1998; Denizer, Gelb, De Melo, 
Tenev, 2001; Godoy, Stiglitz, 2004) have pointed out to the endogeneity of liberalization variable: 
not only performance is explained by the speed of liberalization, but also liberalization itself is a 
function of performance (if performance is poor, it is more difficult for the government to push 
market reforms further). Krueger and Ciolko (1998) demonstrated through constructing the 
instrumental variable (by linking liberalization to initial conditions specified only as the pre-
  22transition share of exports in GDP) that the hypothesis of the endogeneity of the liberalization 
variable cannot be rejected. The worse initial conditions for transformation, the greater the 
probability of the deep transformational recession, and hence the more likely delays in 
liberalization. Godoy and Stiglitz (2004) examined the impact of the speed of privatization variable 
on performance: they instrumented this variable using the variables of pre-transition distortions 
from Popov (2000) and other measures of initial conditions and concluded that, after controlling for 
the level of privatization, the speed (increment) of privatization adversely affected growth in the 
1990s.  
  If there is endogeneity in the regressions presented in previous sections, the estimates cannot 
be considered correct, so it is necessary to resort to 2SLS estimation. Thus, first, the impact of 
liberalization on performance during recession (1989-96) is examined, and later – the impact of the 
level and change in liberalization indices on performance during recovery (1995-2003) is analyzed. 
Liberalization index in 1995 is strongly correlated with the level of democracy in 1990-98 
(R=60%), while the level of democracy itself is not correlated with GDP growth in 1989-96 
(R=5%), so liberalization can be instrumented with the democracy level variable. Economic 
interpretation of this correlation is rather obvious – it is well established that market type reforms 
went hand in hand with democratic reforms in post-communist countries (EBRD, 1999, chapter 5). 
The results are presented in table 4, where the rule of law and democracy indices are used 
separately (so that the liberalization index can be instrumented with the democracy level variable). 
In addition to the rule of law index, the indicator of the increase in the share of shadow economy is 
used to account for the decline in the institutional capacity of the state. This is the objective 
measure of state capacity defined as the ability of the government to enforce rules and regulations
13
.  
  The new result here is that the coefficient of liberalization level in 1995 is negative and 
statistically significant in most specifications: the more liberalized was the economy by 1995, the 
larger was the reduction of GDP in 1989-96, during the transformational recession. This result is 
different from the previous regressions: when liberalization variable was not instrumented, it turned 
out to be insignificant.  
 
                                                 
13
 The number of observations in this case is only 17 (lack of data on shadow economy). Because the increase in the 
share shadow economy is strongly correlated with the decline in the ratio of government revenues to GDP (Popov, 
2000) these two indicators are included into the right hand side of the equation separately (to avoid multicolinearity).    
   
  23 
Table 4. 2SLS robust estimates – regression of change in GDP in 1989-96 on initial conditions, 
institutional capacity, liberalization and rule of law and democracy indices (Liberalization 
index instrumented with the democracy level variable) 
Dependent variable = Log (1996 GDP as a % of 1989 GDP) 
For China - all indicators are for the period of 1979-86 or similar 
Equations, Number of  









Constant  6.4*** 6.3***  6.0*** 6.0*** 
Pre-transition distortions, % of GDP  -.01***  -.02***    -.004 
1987 PPP GDP per capita, % of the US level  -.007**  -.01***     
War dummya  -.45*** -.29
b   
Liberalization index in 1995  -.18**  -.39*  -.19***  -.19*** 
Decline in government revenues as a % of GDP from 
1989-91 to 1993-96 
-.02*** -.02***     
Log (Inflation, % a year, 1990-95,  geometric average)   -1.7***  -.22***  -.22***  -.19*** 
Rule of law index,  average for 1989-97, %    -.01
c   
Increase in the share of shadow economy in GDP in 
1989-94, p.p.  
   -.02***  -.015*** 
R2, %  86 77  88 90 
*, **, *** - significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
aEquals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries. 
b Significant at 12% level. 
c Significant at 16% level.  
 
  Choosing another year for the end of the recession, 1998, and considering the period of 
1989-98, the results (R
2 and T-statistics) worsen somewhat, but still hold. The first equation from 
table 4 takes the form:  
Log(Y98/89) =  6.76 - .41WAR – .01DIST  - .02GOVREVdecline - .23Log(INFL) - .253LIBER 
     (11.51)     (-3.23)        (-2.58)    (-3.11)       (-6.27)       (-2.26) 
Liberalisation index by 1995 is instrumented with the democracy index variable.  
N=28,  R
2 = 69%, T-statistics in brackets. 
 
  Equation 3 from table 4 takes the following form: 
 Log(Y98/89) =  6.14 - .015SHADecon - .23Log(INFL) - .21LIBER 
     (13.62)     (-3.36)       (-4.06)    (-2.30) 
Liberalisation index by 1995 is instrumented with the democracy index variable.  
N=17,  R
2 = 78%, T-statistics in brackets. 
 
  If distortions variable is added to the to this equation, it turns out to be insignificant (the 
farther away the year of the bottom of the recession is moved, the more insignificant it is), but the 
  24variable characterizing the decline in government revenues in the beginning of the 1990s is 
significant even together with the shadow economy indicator: 
Log(Y98/89) =  6.02 - .012SHADecon - .014GOVREVdecline - .21Log(INFL) - .18LIBER 
     (14.94)        (-2.95)       (-1.75)      (-3.93)    (-2.21) 
Liberalisation index by 1995 is instrumented with the democracy index variable, 
(N=17, R
2=87%, T-statistics in brackets).  
 
  On the contrary, for the recovery period, instrumentation of the liberalization variable does 
not lead to different conclusions, but only strengthens previously obtained results. Here it is the 
increase in liberalization during the recovery that needs to be instrumented, because the level of the 
liberalization in 1995, before the recovery, becomes just one of the initial conditions. 
  Two variables are good candidates for the instruments – the FSU dummy (membership in 
the former Soviet Union) and the preceding level of liberalization, i.e. liberalization in 1995. Both 
variables are strongly correlated with increase in liberalization in 1995-2003 (R is equal to 0.76 and 
-0.86 respectively), but not correlated with the GDP change in 1995-2003 (R is 0.24 and -0.28), so 
they could be used as an instruments for the change in the liberalization index in 1995-2003. The 
economic interpretation of this correlation is that countries of the former Soviet Union in general 
liberalized their economies more slowly than other (East European) transition economies, so that 
liberalization index by 1995 was rather low and the bulk of liberalization occurred later than in EE 
countries, i.e. in 1995-2003; besides, the more liberalized were transition economies by 1995, the 
shorter was part of the road to achieve full liberalization, so the relationship between liberalization 
stock by 1995 and subsequent liberalization increment is, as expected, negative. The results are in 
table 5 and are no different from those reported in table 3, describing regressions without the 
instrumentation of liberalization change variable: in fact, the coefficient of instrumented 
liberalization change variable is higher and no less significant than without instrumentation. 
  To test the robustness, another periods for the economic recovery were selected (1995-2005 
and 1998-2005, figures for 2005 are preliminary). The results are even stronger than before – R
2 
and T-statistics are generally better even without the control variable that was used previously – 
GDP change in 1989-96 (this latter variable becomes insignificant). For the 1998-2005 period the 
variable characterizing the decline in government revenues becomes insignificant as well and the  
  25significance of war dummy variable declines (from 5 to 10% level in most regressions). These 
results are reported in table 6.  
 
Table 5. 2SLS robust estimates – regression of change in GDP in 1995-2003 on initial 
conditions, institutional capacity, liberalization and rule of law and democracy indices  
Dependent variable = 2003 GDP as a % of 1995 GDP 
For China the indicator is for the period 10 years earlier. 
Equations, Number of  








N = 28 
Instruments for liberalization change in 1995-03 
variable 




Constant  97.8*** 95.8***  97.7*** 79.5*** 
1996 GDP as a % of 1989 GDP        .18* 
War dummya  19.5* 19.8**  19.5* 25.0** 
Increase in liberalization index in 1995-2003  18.2***  19.2**  18.3***  22.9*** 
Decline in government revenues as a % of GDP 
from 1989-91 to 1993-96 
-.76*** -.78** -.76*** -.65*** 
Rule of law index,  average for 1989-97, %  1.24***  1.28***  1.25***  1.13*** 
Democracy index, average for 1990-98, %  -.76***  -.76***  -.76***  -.62*** 
R2, %  55 54  55 56 
*, **, *** - significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
aEquals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries. 
 
 
Table 6. 2SLS robust estimates – regression of change in GDP in 1995-2005 on initial 
conditions, institutional capacity, liberalization and rule of law and democracy indices  
For China the indicator is for the period 10 years earlier. 
Dependent variable  2005 GDP as a % of 1995   2005 GDP as a % of 1998 
Equations, Number of  
































War dummya  32.6** 32.9** 32.6**  19.3*  18.7* 19.3* 









Decline in government revenues as a % of 





-.1.03***      













-.99*** -.70***  -.69 
*** 
-.70*** 
  26R2, %  63   63  63  63  64  63 
*, **, *** - significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
aEquals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries. 
 
  So what needs to be explained is the negative impact of “liberalization stock”, accumulated 
by 1995, on economic performance in 1989-96 – this negative impact becomes visible only when 
liberalization is instrumented via democracy level indicator, whereas without instrumentation this 
impact is insignificant. The interpretation of this result is quite straightforward. Liberalization is 
best explained by the democratization process (it pushes liberalization forward) and pre-transition 
distortions (large distortions force policy-makers to slow down liberalization because they are 
afraid of the collapse of output). Democratization pushes liberalization forward too much, even 
accounting for other factors that influence liberalization, such as the negative impact of pre-
transition distortions, so liberalization, inasmuch as it is determined endogenously, has a negative 
impact on performance. The impact of residual liberalization (i.e. inasmuch as it is not determined 
within the specified model) is positive, but insignificant. Including the residual liberalization into 
the right hand side of the regression equation is equivalent to including actual liberalization together 
with democracy variable (see table 1, equation 7 – liberalization impact is positive, but 
insignificant). 
  The negative impact of fast liberalization is associated with the rapid decline of the non-
competitive industries that is not counterweighed by the rise of competitive sectors. The speed of 
the transfer of resources from non-competitive to competitive sectors is not infinite, it depends on a 
flow of new investment, so when fast liberalization creates a need for restructuring that exceeds the 
investment potential of the economy, there is a general reduction of output – a typical supply-side 
recession that could have been avoided with slower pace of liberalization.  
 
       6. Concluding remarks 
  Differences in performance during the initial stage of transition (transformational recession) 
depend strongly on the initial conditions – pre-transition levels of GDP per capita and distortions in 
industrial structure and external trade patterns. The higher the distortions (militarization, 
overindustrialization, "under-openness" of the economy and the share of perverted trade flows), the 
worse the performance as measured by the GDP change. And the higher was GDP per capita before 
  27transition, the greater were distortions embodied in fixed capital stock, the more difficult it was to 
overcome these distortions (because more investment was needed) to achieve growth. 
  By focusing on liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization as key policy variables in 
transition economies the conventional wisdom overlooked the impact of strong institutions. 
Accounting for uneven initial conditions sheds new light on the relative importance of various 
policy factors. Macroeconomic stability continues to matter a great deal – the inclusion of the 
inflation variable improves goodness of fit, but liberalization index in the initial period of transition 
(during the transformational recession that continued in most countries until mid 1990s) does not 
appear to be important – the coefficient is not statistically significant and in most cases has 
unexpected sign. On the contrary, changes in the institutional capacity of the state have dramatic 
impact on performance. It follows that the debate about the speed of the liberalization (shock 
therapy versus gradualism) was to a large extent misfocused, whereas the crucial importance of 
strong institutions for good performance was overlooked. 
   After allowing for differing initial conditions, it turns out that the fall in output in transition 
economies was associated mostly with poor business environment, resulting from institutional 
collapse. Liberalization alone, when it is not complemented with strong institutions, can not ensure 
good performance. Institutional capacities in turn, depend to a large extent on the combination of 
the rule of law and democracy: the data seem to suggest that both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes can have strong rule of law and can deliver efficient institutions, whereas under the weak 
rule of law authoritarian regimes do a better job in maintaining efficient institutions than 
democracies. To put it in a shorter form, the record of illiberal democracies in ensuring institutional 
capacities is the worst, which predictably has a devastating impact on output.  
Moreover, the impact of the speed of liberalization at the initial stage of transition, i.e. 
during the transformational recession, appears to be negative, if any. To the extent the speed of 
liberalization was endogenous, i.e. inasmuch as it was determined by political economy forces, 
pushing it forward (like democratization) or holding it back (like pre-transition distortions that 
could have led to the collapse of output during liberalization and hence frightened policymakers), it 
turns out that the impact of liberalization was negative, rather than positive. The reason for the 
negative impact is most probably associated with limited ability of the economy to adjust to new 
price ratios that emerge after rapid liberalization, and in particular – with investment constraints that 
  28do not allow to transfer rapidly capital stock from inefficient to efficient industries and to 
compensate the fall in output in non-competitive sectors by the rise in competitive sectors.   
 To conclude, the process of the collapse of output in transition economies is best described 
by the supply side recession model, where the key determinants are initial conditions and the 
strength of institutions, whereas the speed of liberalization, to the extent it was endogenous, i.e. 
driven by political economy factors, had an adverse effect on performance. 
At the recovery stage liberalization starts to affect growth positively, whereas the impact of 
pre-transition distortions disappears. Institutional capacity and macroeconomic policy continue to 
be important prerequisites for successful performance. Liberalization, which proceeds much more 
slowly at the recovery stage (and for some countries is even negative – see fig. 9) influences 
performance positively because it creates market stimuli without causing rapid collapse of output in 
inefficient industries, which cannot be compensated fully by the rise of efficient industries due to 
investment constraints.   
To be sure, these factors are not sufficient to explain an “economic miracle”, like in China, 
which remains an outlier in all regressions. Very rapid growth is virtually always associated with 
the increase in export/GDP ratio, i.e. it is an export-led growth, and it requires export-oriented 
industrial strategy. The key and most efficient instrument of this export-oriented industrial strategy 
appears to be undervalued exchange rate that is maintained through accumulation of foreign 
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  32APPENDIX. Determining the year of the end of the recession and the start of the recovery 
 
The determination of the exact date of the trough of the downturn and the start of recovery 
for all 26 countries that experienced transformational recession (China and Vietnam are excluded 
from the sample) poses some problems. Assigning a specific trough for each and every country is 
problematic because the cross-country comparison in this case will ignore the length of recession 
(which lasted from 2 years in Poland to 10 years in Moldova – see fig. 1A).  
Formal methods to determine a single year for all countries give different results. The 
unweighted average of GDP indices for 26 countries bottoms out in 1994, whereas the parabolic 
approximation of panel data (GDP by year and by country as a % of 1989 level) determines the year 
of the bottom of the recession as in between 1996 and 1997
14
 (fig. 1A). The use of more 
sophisticated methods of finding the structural break in the series is also questionable: the choice of 
any single year will overestimate the length of the recession in some countries and/or underestimate 
the length of the recession in the other.  
Hence, the approach chosen in this paper is to use several alternative years of the end of the 
recession and the start of the recovery and to show that the results hold, no matter which particular 
year is chosen. For the recession trough 1996 and 1998 were used, so the periods considered were 
1989-96 and 1989-98. The absolute trough was reached before the end of 1994 in 14 countries out 
of 26, by the end of 1996 – in 21 countries, and by the end of 1998 – in 24 countries. For the start of 
the recovery the year 1994 was used in the earlier article (Popov, 2000), so the period considered 
was 1994-98. In the current article the years 1995 and 1998 were assumed to be the start of the 
recovery and three periods were considered – 1995-2003, 1995-2005 and 1998-2005. The results 
were generally unchanged, but weakened somewhat when the period of recession was stretched 
forward by 2 years (from 1989-86 to 1989-98) and when the period of the beginning of recovery 
was stretched backwards (from 1998 to 1995). The best results were obtained for the recession 
period 1989-96 and for the recovery period 1998-2005, which is quite consistent with intuition.   
 
                                                 
14
 Output = 2110067 + 0.5292629 (YEAR)
2 – 2113.523 (YEAR), 
       (11.65)  (11.64)      (-11.64)    
N = 442 (17 years and 26 countries), R
2 = 23, T-statistics in brackets.  
F.O.C. allow to determine the exact year of the minimum – it is 1996.7. 
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